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Figure 1: A user performs three joint t-SNE projections with three data providers to compare the data quality. (a)–(c), the joint
t-SNE results with dataset A, B, and C, respectively. The class labels are encoded by colors. Users’ local data points are denoted
by black borders.
ABSTRACT
Nowadays, as data becomes increasingly complex and distributed,
data analyses often involve several related datasets that are stored
on different servers and probably owned by different stakeholders.
While there is an emerging need to provide these stakeholders with
a full picture of their data under a global context, conventional
visual analytical methods, such as dimensionality reduction, could
expose data privacy when multi-party datasets are fused into a
single site to build point-level relationships. In this paper, we
reformulate the conventional t-SNE method from the single-site
mode into a secure distributed infrastructure. We present a secure
multi-party scheme for joint t-SNE computation, which can min-
imize the risk of data leakage. Aggregated visualization can be
optionally employed to hide disclosure of point-level relationships.
We build a prototype system based on our method, SMAP, to
support the organization, computation, and exploration of secure
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joint embedding. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach
with three case studies, one of which is based on the deployment of
our system in real-world applications.
Index Terms: High-dimensional data visualization—secure
visualization—dimensionality reduction—secure multi-party
computation;
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, as data is often distributed at multiple privacy-sensitive
sites, individual data owners want to overcome this “isolated
islands” problem [46] to gain a full picture of their data with a
global context and without leaking their own local data. Such a
need may come from several hospitals that want to perform a joint
analysis of their patient data while keeping their data privacy, or
from a buyer in a data market who has to check the quality of
several datasets from commercial data providers before making a
data-purchasing decision [4].
When using visualization techniques to help people understand
multi-party high-dimensional datasets, we often employ dimen-
sionality reduction techniques, such as Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA) [43], Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) [26], and t-
distributed stochastic neighbor embedding (t-SNE) [31], to project
all the data points into a shared space. However, this approach faces
two challenges when applied to privacy-sensitive multi-party data
analysis. First, data privacy can be breached when dimensionality
reduction techniques are used to generate data for visualization.
For example, conventional dimensionality reduction methods are
designed for single-site computation and need to gather original
data from all sites to create a joint embedding. Apparently, this
approach can cause privacy leaks when original data is transmitted
to other parties. Simply anonymizing data before the multi-party
dimensionality is also infeasible. Anonymized data would reduce
the utility of data and lead to inaccurate layouts. In addition,
even anonymized data possesses values that need to be protected.
Second, data privacy may be threatened when other people use
certain visualization designs to examine privacy-sensitive data. In
particular, when visualization users are also data providers, they
may have the authority to explore the low-dimensional embedding
of data from other parties. The similarity in the low-dimensional
space could disclose point-level relationships to some extent.
To address these challenges, secure multi-party visualization is
needed. We define “secure multi-party visualization” as a method
to visualize datasets from multiple parties in a shared space while
keeping data privacy of each party. In this paper, we propose
a joint dimensionality reduction scheme for secure multi-party
visualization. Our scheme can help to preserve data privacy at
both visualization generation stage and visualization consuming
stage. First, we develop a secure multi-party computation scheme
for t-SNE embedding. We choose t-SNE because it is one of the
most popular dimensionality reduction methods in visualization.
In addition, it is reported to achieve high overall quality results
in common tasks including cluster separation [21]. The essential
challenge in redesigning t-SNE is that both the original data and
the distance matrix among data points can threaten data privacy.
Neither of them should be exposed to any participant. Therefore,
we introduce two collaborators into the scheme. One collaborator
can have only encrypted data and distance matrix, and the other can
only access the noised data and distance matrix. Most importantly,
the accurate t-SNE embedding can be computed with the noised
distance matrix in our design. Both the data and distance matrix
are kept private from participants. Second, we build an online
visualization system, SMAP (Secure Multi-pArty Projection), to
organize the joint embedding tasks among multiple participants
and support privacy-aware exploration of embedding results. In
particular, our method supports two levels of visualization author-
ity. Scatterplots allow participants to have point-level embedding
information of all datasets. Aggregated visualization that is based
on density map supports stricter requirements, with which the point-
level relationships are hidden from other participants. In addition, a
set of descriptive views are coordinated to support task organization
and data exploration.
The major contributions of this paper include:
• a secure multi-party dimensionality reduction scheme for joint
t-SNE; and
• a coordinated online visualization system to support privacy-
aware exploration and online task organization.
In the rest of the paper, we review related work in Section 2 and
give an overview of our approach in Section 3. We describe the
joint embedding in Section 4 and the online visualization system
in Section 5. Then, we demonstrate case studies in Section 6
and discuss our approach in Section 7. The paper concludes in
Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Security-aware Distributed Machine Learning and
Data Mining
When raw data is distributed in multiple participants, it is challeng-
ing to build machine learning or data mining models among them
due to security issues. A common approach to address the issue is
applying the differential privacy theory [20] that changes the raw
input data with a randomized mechanism and keeps the utility of
data. In practice, random perturbation, such as via Gaussian noise
[3] and Laplacian noise [34], is often used. However, while adding
more noise can preserve privacy, this approach may compromise
accuracy significantly and lead to interpretation bias of resulting
patterns.
Many research efforts have been devoted to Secure Multi-
Party Computation (SMPC) for distributed machine learning and
data mining applications. Based on cryptographic protocols, the
raw data are computed without perturbation in a secure manner.
The SMPC schemes are built upon classical cryptographic proto-
cols [23], including garbled circuits [12,47], homomorphic encryp-
tion [22, 36], oblivious transfer [13, 39], and secret sharing [10, 28].
To support secure outsourced computation of k-means clustering,
Almutairi et al. [6] designed a protocol based on fully homomorphic
encryption. However, their distance matrix among data points
is exposed to the third party. Almutairi et al. [7] proposed the
secure chain distance matrix to avoid exposure. However, it
contains order information only and cannot support dimensionality
reduction approaches. To speed up the SMPC, Peter et al. [37]
designed a protocol based on additive homomorphic encryption
(AHE) rather than fully homomorphic encryption. Their protocol
contains two collaborators to reduce the communication between
participants and collaborators. However, the issue of exposing the
distance matrix remains to be addressed.
2.2 Privacy-Preserving Visualization
In the visualization domain, a variety of data types often involve
sensitive information, such as health records for multi-dimensional
data [19] or events for EMRs data [16]. Imposing privacy-
preserving operations to visualization can prevent unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive information while visualization utility can
be maintained and user insight gained from visualization can be
maximized. Similar to the counterpart approaches in the data
mining field [5], the protection aims at two major risk types:
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure. While the former
prevents the individual identity from being linked to a specific data
item, the latter protects sensitive attributes that can be inferred
from linking individuals to other attributes. A common strategy to
address the risks is to apply visual uncertainty (e.g., blur effects or
aggregated clusters) in the display of the sensitive information [16].
For example, Dasgupta et. al. [18] developed an enhanced parallel
coordinates to visualize sensitive multi-dimensional data where
private records are displayed as visual clusters between pairwise
axes. To further assess the trade-off of privacy protection against
visualization utility, a set of quantification measures have been
proposed [17]. Wang et. al. [42] further improved the approach
by integrating a pipeline to support interactive control over
visualization utility and the level of privacy protection. Other
privacy-preserving operations, such as redirecting links for graph
layouts or directly deleting anomaly patterns containing sensitive
information, are also discussed in [16].
In contrast to addressing the privacy issues in the original, high-
dimensional visual space, our approach aims at embedding it in
the low-dimensional space upon which the disclosure of identity
and attribute can be naturally eliminated while substantial patterns
such as clusters or anomalies can be preserved. If the point-
level relationships are highly sensitive in stricter cases, aggregated
visualization can be employed to hide the point-level information.
2.3 Dimensionality Reduction
Dimensionality reduction techniques are well studied for
scatterplot-based high-dimensional data visualization. Intuitively,
they can project the data into low-dimensional space while
preserving specific properties. For example, Principal Component
Analysis (PCA) [43] preserves the variance among data points.
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [11] tries to keep clusters
separable from each other. The t-distributed Stochastic
Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [31] and various variances of
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) [26] are designed to preserve
the similarities among data points based on the distance matrix.
Similarly, ISOMAP [41] aims to keep the geometric distance in
the projected space. Recently, UMAP [33] and BH-tSNE [38]
require to compute the distances among the k-nearest neighbors.
More details of dimensionality reduction methods can be found in
surveys [21, 30].
Because dimensionality reduction compresses data information,
it is used to preserve data privacy in a wide range of applications.
A set of dimensionality reduction methods are designed to discard
the privacy-sensitive information and simultaneously preserve the
utility of data in specific applications,such as machine learning [35],
data mining [27], and distance-based classification [8]. It should
be noted that the motivation of these methods is different from
ours. They utilize dimensionality reduction to address privacy issue
when publishing it for further applications. The dimensionality
reduction is performed in a single site. In contrast, we aim to
prevent data exposure from other participants during the multi-
party dimensionality reduction. The dimensionality reduction is
conducted among multiple participants who are privacy-sensitive.
The work by Saha et al. [40] is most similar to ours. This
work proposed to build a joint t-SNE among multiple participants.
While pairwise distances were unavailable due to security issues,
their method built embeddings around a shared dataset locally
and iteratively integrated the embeddings as one. However, the
requirement of the shared dataset limits the application in many
private data analysis scenarios. In addition, the quality of the
joint embedding depends on the volume of the shared dataset. As
reported in Saha et al. [40], heavy overlaps among clusters would
happen with insufficient shared data. By contrast, we propose a
Security Multi-party Computation framework for accurate t-SNE
layout generation without requiring shared dataset.
3 SCENARIOS, REQUIREMENTS, AND APPROACH
OVERVIEW
In this section, we present two use scenarios to clarify the motiva-
tion and application of secure multi-party visualization. Through
the analysis of the two scenarios, we conclude the requirements
of participants in a secure multi-party visualization. Then, we
overview the proposed approach.
3.1 Example Scenarios
Multi-party data analytics. In this scenario, a group of partici-
pants want to analyze local data in the context of all global data
when keeping data privacy from each other. For example, analysts
from multiple community hospitals want to explore differences
among communities and identify abnormal patients. However, they
cannot fuse their data due to privacy concerns. With the secure joint
embedding, they can project local data points in a shared space,
where the similarity among all data points can be visualized and
analyzed. The global patterns and distributions of each community
are disclosed in the shared visualization. With the full picture, these
hospitals can visually locate their own records in the global context.
For instance, a hospital can verify if there is any similar patient
to a special local case in other hospitals. These insights can also
guide further communications among the participating hospitals for
further information rather than just low-dimensional layout. If there
are stricter constraints on data privacy that prohibits the disclosure
of point-level relationships, these hospitals could only share the
aggregated visualization for distribution information.
Data purchasing. In data-driven applications, users often need
to buy rich data to train their machine learning model through data
markets [15] (e.g., BDEX [1] and Qlik [2]). Considering the high
price of datasets, users must carefully select appropriate datasets,
for example, that covers the failed samples or supports the rare
classes. However, there is no scheme that allows users to know
the structure of a dataset before they buy it [4, 15]. Secure multi-
party visualization provides a tool for users to compare their local
data with data on sale without data privacy being scarified. This
information transparency helps users to make purchase decisions.
From the perspective of commercial data providers, secure multi-
party visualization allows them to demonstrate their data to users
without losing their data. This tool can promote data selling. In
this scenario, data providers can decide the strategy of visualization,
such as scatterplots with point-level information, or aggregated
visualization with only region-level information.
3.2 Requirement Analysis
Through the analysis of these application scenarios, we conclude
the major requirements on a secure multi-party visualization
scheme.
R1: Preserve the privacy during the multi-party visualiza-
tion generation. Security is the major concern of the participants.
Both the constraints of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and the need to protect data assets prevent participants from
revealing the original data to others. Considering the fact that all
participants are curious about data, it should be guaranteed that all
participants cannot obtain or infer the original data in the entire
process.
R2: Preserve the privacy during the visualization consum-
ing. The second difference between secure joint embedding
and conventional joint embedding is that privacy should also be
preserved at the visualization consuming stage. In a scatter-
plot, each participant should only be allowed to explore the low-
dimensional representation of global data points rather than high-
dimensional representations. If point-level relationships are also
considered, aggregated visualization should be employed rather
than scatterplots.
R3: Support interactive exploration of privacy-aware visual-
ization results. With the visualization results, participants need
to know the structure of global data, compare the distributions
of participants, and analyze the high-dimensional information of
interested data from other participants. The difference between the
exploration of secure joint embedding and conventional embedding
results is that only limited information is available in secure
joint embedding because of privacy concerns. While only low-
dimensional layout of global data is provided to each participant,
they can only infer the high-dimensional information by local data
and the similarities among local data and global data. A set
of coordinated views and interactive tools are needed to support
privacy-aware exploration.
R4: Support the organization of online joint embedding
tasks among multiple participants. In addition to joint em-
bedding algorithms, an online system to connect participants in
different sites is needed to set the framework in a real environment.
The system should support participants to browse published tasks,
propose tasks, join proposed tasks, and trace the participating tasks.
Because the process of multi-party visualization is time-consuming,
it is important to keep following up on the progress and results of
joint embedding tasks.
3.3 Approach Overview
Based on the above requirements, we propose a joint t-SNE scheme
and develop an online visualization system for secure multi-party
visualization. First, we propose a secure multi-party protocol for
joint t-SNE. The protocol is designed to preserve data privacy.
Only encrypted and noised data are transferred to two external
collaborators. No explicit high-dimensional representations or the
pairwise distances are exposed to any participants or collabora-
tors. The security of data is guaranteed with two non-collusion
collaborators. Second, we design an online visualization system
that combines a set of coordinated views. Privacy-preserving
visualizations and privacy-aware explorations are supported by the
system. In addition, the online system connects the participants
from different sites and organizes online joint embedding tasks.
4 SECURE MULTI-PARTY PROJECTION
In this section, we describe our secure multi-party projection
scheme for t-SNE. It embeds distributed data points from multiple
participants into a shared layout and preserves the privacy of local
data. We first briefly review the t-SNE algorithm, and then describe
the protocol of our secure multi-party t-SNE. After that, we analyze
the security and accuracy of the proposed protocol.
4.1 The t-SNE algorithm
In high-dimensional space, the similarity between two data points xi
and x j is represented by a symmetric probability pi j , which means
the probability that xi is a neighbor of x j . pi j is given by
pi j =
(p j|i+ pi| j)
2N
, (1)
where N is the number of points, and the conditional probability
p j|i is given by
p j|i =
exp(−||xi−x j||
2/2σ2i )
∑k 6=l exp(−||xi−xk||
2/2σ2i )
, (2)
where σ2i is the variance of the Gaussian that is centered on data
point xi, ||xi−x j|| is the Euclidean distance between xi and x j .
In low-dimensional space, t-SNE employs a t-distribution with
one degree of freedom to describe the distribution. The joint
probability qi j , which measures the similarity between points yi and
y j , is defined as
qi j =
(1+ ||yi−y j||
2)−1
∑k 6=l(1+ ||yk −yl ||
2)−1
, (3)
where yi and y j are the embedding of xi and x j , respectively.
The t-SNE algorithm optimizes the embedding by minimizing
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the probability distribu-
tions in high-dimensional space and low-dimensional space. The
Kullback-Leibler divergence is given by
C = KL(P||Q) = ∑
i
∑
j
pi jlog
pi j
qi j
. (4)
4.2 Secure Multi-Party Protocol for joint t-SNE
Through the review of t-SNE algorithm, we know that the key
step is to compute the conditional probability p j|i in the high-
dimensional space. Equation 2 shows that the computation of
p j|i depends on the computation of pairwise distances in high-
dimensional space, which is a barrier of reformulating conventional
dimensionality reduction approaches into a secure multi-participant
version, because the pairwise distance matrix cannot be exposed
to any participant. Therefore, the computation of p j|i must be
redesigned.
To address this issue, we propose a secure multi-party protocol
for t-SNE. In addition to the participants (P) who own data, two
collaborators, S and T , are introduced into the protocol to provide
computing service. The architecture is presented in Figure 2. Due
to privacy concerns, T has only encrypted data without the private
key, while Shas only noised data. S and T cooperate with each
other to compute the t-SNE layout and distribute the results to
the participants. Data privacy is preserved under the assumption
that these two collaborators will not collude with each other. All
the participants are semi-honest and will execute the protocol
Figure 2: The architecture of SMAP. The system is set in a server
to organize online joint embedding tasks. The server connects
and organizes the two collaborators and multiple participants.
Collaborators S and T are distributed on two different sites and
connected to each other. The participants are connected to the two
collaborators.
Table 1: The notation definitions.
Notation Description
P Participating parties who are the date owners.
S, T Two collaborators who perform the secure comput-
ing.
PK The public key. PK() is the encryption operation.
SK The private key. SK() is the decryption operation.
◦,⋄,⋆ The addition, subtraction, and scalar multiplication
operations for encrypted data, respectively.
x,X x is a high-dimensional data point. X is the collection
of high-dimensional data.
xi j xi j is the noised entry as xi j = xi j+σi j .
σi j The noise term of xi j .
δi jk A noise term. δi jk = σik −σ jk.
di j,D di j is the Euclidean distance between xi and x j. D is
the corresponding distance matrix.
zi j,Z zi j is the squired noised distance between xi and x j
regarding to noise term σi j. Z is the corresponding
squired noised distance Matrix between all data
point pairs.
wi j,W wi j is the noised distance between xi and x j , wi j =
di j + ηi. W is the corresponding noised distance
matrix.
ηi The noise term of the ith row inW .
W ′ The result of randomly reorderingW by row and by
column.
M The symmetric probability matrix.
M′ The reordered result of M, of which the indexes are
the same asW ′.
correctly. While credit-driven collaborators exist in reality, non-
collusion and semi-honest models are practical for large-scale data
processing [48].
The process of our protocol is illustrated in Figure 3. For the
clarity of description, we list the notations in Table 1. The protocol
contains eight steps of data transmission and computation.
Step 1: Key generation and broadcasting. S generates the
public key PK for data encryption and the private key SK for data
decryption. S broadcasts PK to T and all P. In our protocol, we
used additive homomorphic encryption [36] for data encryption.
participants P Collaborator T
Step 1:
Key Generation and 
Broadcasting
Generate AHE keypairs<PK,SK>
Step 2:
Encrypted Data Collection
Send PK(X)
Encrypt data X
Add noises to PK(X)
Send noised 
encrypted data
Step 3:
Encrypted Data Noising
Decrypt noised encrypted data;
Encrypt after calculating
noised distances Z as PK(Z) 
Send PK(Z)
Step 4:
Noised Distance Computation
Send PK(W′)
Step 5:
Encrypted Distance Computation
Calculate symmetric 
probability matrix M′
Send M′   
Step 6:
Adding Noise Term to
the Encrypted Distance
Send t-SNE layout
Step 7:
Symmetric Probability 
Computation
Broadcast PK
Compute the encrypted 
distance matrix PK(D)
 Add noises to PK(D) as PK(W);
reorder rows and columns 
of it as PK(W′)
Step 8:
 t-SNE Embedding
{
recover M′ order;
compute the t-SNE layout
{{{{{{{
Broadcast PK
Collaborator S
Figure 3: The pipeline of secure multi-party protocol for joint t-
SNE.
Under Additive Homomorphic Encryption (AHE), the addition
and scalar multiplication are preserved. Specifically, we have
SK(PK(a) ◦ PK(b)) = a+ b, SK(PK(a) ⋄ PK(b)) = a− b, and
SK(a ⋆PK(b)) = a ∗ b, where PK() refers to encryption with the
public key PK; SK() refers to decryption using the private key
SK, ◦, ⋄; and ⋆ are addition, subtraction, and scalar multiplication
operations for encrypted data, respectively.
Step 2: Encrypted data collection. Each P encrypts local data
X with the public key PK and sends the encrypted data PK(X) to
T .
Step 3: Encrypted data noising.Given the data X from all
participating parties, T adds a random noise to each entry of
the encrypted data. Specifically, for each xi j , which is the jth
dimension of data point xi, T computes PK(xi j) = PK(xi j) ◦
PK(σi j), where σi j is a random noise. Then, T sends the noised
encrypted data to S.
Step 4: Noised distance computation. First, Collaborate S
decrypts the noised data with SK(PK(xi j)) = xi j+σi j. Second, the
noised Euclidean distance zi j between xi and x j is computed as
zi j =
m
∑
k=1
((xik+σik)− (x jk+σ jk))
2, (5)
where m is the dimensionality of data points. Third, S encrypts the
noised distances as PK(Z) and sends to T , where Z is the encrypted
noised distance matrix.
Step 5: Encrypted distance computation. In this step, Collab-
orate T computes the encrypted accurate distance matrix D.
In Equation 5, we denote σik −σ jk as δi jk. The Equation 5 is
rewritten as
zi j =
m
∑
k=1
(x2ik+x
2
jk +δ
2
i jk −2xikx jk+2xikδi jk−2x jkδi jk). (6)
Furthermore, we denote the Euclidean distance between xi and
x j as di j in Equation 6. We have
zi j = d
2
i j+
m
∑
k=1
(δ 2i jk+2xikδi jk−2x jkδi jk). (7)
Therefore, the encrypted squared distance PK(d2i j) can be com-
puted by
PK(zi j)⋄
m
∑
k=1
(PK(δ 2i jk)◦PK(2δi jk)⋆PK(xik)⋄PK(2δi jk)⋆PK(x jk)).
(8)
Because Collaborate T records the noise term δi jk in Step 3, the
scalar multiplication ⋆ between PK(xik) and δi jk is allowed. We
denote the encrypted distance matrix as PK(D).
Step 6: Adding noise term to the encrypted distance. In this
step, Collaborate T adds noises to the encrypted distance matrix
PK(D) and sends the noised matrix to collaborate S. For each entry
PK(d2i j) in the jth line of PK(D) except for PK(d
2
ii), T adds a
random noise ηi to it as PK(wi j) = PK(d
2
i j) ◦PK(ηi), where wi j
denotes the noised entry d2i j . If the entry d
2
ii adds the same noise, S
can obtain the noise ηi by SK(PK(d
2
ii ◦PK(ηi))), because the d
2
ii is
always zero. The noised matrix is denoted as PK(W ). After that, T
reorders the rows and columns of PK(w) and denotes the reordered
matrix as PK(W ′). The mapping between PK(W ) and PK(W ′) is
saved in T . Finally, T sends PK(W ′) to S.
Step 7: Symmetric Probability Computation. In this step, S
computes the symmetric probability in the high-dimensional space.
Given the noised distance matrixW ′ by SK(PK(W ′)), we have
p′j|i=
exp(−(d2i j +ηi)/2σ
2
i )
∑k 6=l exp(−(d
2
ik
+ηi)/2σ2i )
=
exp(−d2i j/2σ
2
i )exp(−ηi/2σ
2
i )
∑k 6=l exp(−d
2
ik
/2σ2i )exp(−ηi/2σ
2
i )
=
exp(−d2i j/2σ
2
i )
∑k 6=l exp(−d
2
ik
/2σ2i )
= p j|i
(9)
While ηi can be removed from Equation 9 by a fraction reduc-
tion, we have p′
j|i = p j|i according to Equation 2. Therefore, S can
compute the conditional probability p j|i with the noised distance
matrix W ′. pi| j can be computed similarly. After that, pi j can
be computed by Equation 1. We denote the symmetric probability
matrix as M′. Finally, S sends M′ to T . It is worth noting that the
indexes inM′ are not the same as that inW .
Step 8: t-SNE Embedding. Having the reordered probability
matrix M′, T recover its order as M according to the mapping
between between PK(W ) and PK(W ′) in Step 6. After that, T
computes the t-SNE embedding by optimizing Equation 4.
4.3 Protocol Analysis
Security. As analyzed above, there are two privacy-sensitive data
items in the entire process: the original data and the distance
matrix. Having the full distance matrix, one can easily recover the
original data with a few geometric computations based on a few
data points. Therefore, we should guarantee that no participants
can get any one of the two data items. We analyze the three
kinds of roles: participants P, collaborator S, and collaborator
T . First, the participants P have only their local data and the
distributed embedding results. It is highly impractical to recover the
accurate pairwise distances from the t-SNE embedding. Therefore,
the information security is guaranteed. Second, S has the public
key PK, private key SK (see Step 1), the noised encrypted data
xi j+σi j (see Step 3), and the noised and reordered distance matrix
W ′ (see Step 7). Because the noises are known only by T , S can
recover neither the original data nor the distance matrix. The noised
distance matrix W is randomly reordered as W ′, so that S does
not have the correct index to recover the row-based noise term η .
Otherwise, S can build linear equations by subtracting symmetric
entries of W and solve it for η . Third, T has only the encrypted
data (see Step 2) and the encrypted distance matrix (see Step 5). It
cannot recover the privacy-sensitive data items without the private
key. As a result, the security of data can be guaranteed in our
protocol.
This security analysis has not considered that low-dimensional
embedding would expose point-level relationships, because it is
exactly the object of t-SNE. Instead, we will analyze this issue in
Section 5.
Accuracy. The embedding result is exactly the same as that from
the standard t-SNE algorithm. It is worth noting that although
noises are added to the pairwise distance in Step 6, the noise can
be removed implicitly in Equation 9 by a fraction reduction (Step
7). In Step 8, T obtains the exact symmetric probability matrix
M, which is required by a t-SNE algorithm (see Equation 4). The
following optimization is the same as the standard t-SNE algorithm.
Therefore, our protocol presents a joint exact t-SNE embedding.
5 SMAP SYSTEM
We designed an interactive online system, SMAP, to organize the
visualization tasks among multiple participants (R4) and support
the exploration of privacy-aware visualization results (R3). Aggre-
gated visualization for point-level privacy-preserving is integrated
(R4). In this section, we introduce the architecture, aggregated
visualization, and the user interface of SMAP.
5.1 Architecture and Implementation
Figure 2 shows the architecture of SMAP. There are three kinds
of roles in the system. The server organizes the schedule of each
joint embedding task and provides a platform that connects the
collaborators and participants. It has only the information for task
organization but not the transferred data among the participants and
collaborators. The collaborators provide the computing resources,
such as cloud computing, for joint embedding.
S and T belong to two different reputable entities without
collusion. Organized by the server, S and T are connected
with each other and send encrypted or noised data to each other.
The participants are connected to the two collaborators following
the secure multi-party protocol. S broadcasts the public key to
them. They send the encrypted data to T and receive visualization
results from T . An client interactive interface is installed in each
participant for task management and exploration of visualization
results.
SMAP is developed as a web-based system. Its front end is
implemented with JavaScript and D3.js. The back end of the server
is implemented with python. We use a Python-based library for
the partially homomorphic encryption 1 and develop a multi-thread
implementation. In our case studies, the clients are browsed in
laptops with an Intel i7-8750H CPU, which supports 12 threads,
16GB CPU memory, and a GeForce GTX 1060 with 6GB GPU
memory. Each server has an Intel Xeon E5-2683 v4 CPU (32GB
memory), which supports 32 threads.
5.2 User Interface for Participants
In this section, we introduce the design and interaction of the
privacy-aware user interface for participants (Figure 4). The
interface contains the task organization panels (R4), visualization
results of joint embedding (R2), and a set of descriptive views for
the data.
1https://python-paillier.readthedocs.io/en/develop/
Online task organization. In the task list panel (Figure 4a),
participants can browse the online tasks, join in a preparing task,
and propose a new task. After selecting a task in the list, the task
description panel (Figure 4b). presents the task information, such
as the contents of data and the participants. For a participating task,
participants can switch to the tab of ”My Participating Task”, which
presents the details of all collaborators and participants, including
their roles, IP addresses, states, and contributed data points. This
panel also supports the task operations, including data encryption
and upload.
Visualizations of joint embedding. The privacy-aware embed-
ding results are presented in two views. The global projection
view (Figure 4c) presents the embedding results of data from all
participants. In the individual projection view (Figure 4d), only
the data of the selected participant is displayed according to the
global embedding. To fulfill the privacy-preserving requirements,
we provide two visualization strategies. When participants want
to know point-level relationships, the results are presented as
scatterplots, in which color encodes data ownership or data class.
In the scatterplot mode, participants can freely select local points
with a lasso tool in these two views. Because participants are
limited to access the original local data, they can only infer the high-
dimensional representation of data of others by selecting nearby
local data.
When participants are aware of point-level privacy, aggregated
visualization is provided to show the joint embedding results.
Mostly popular designs for aggregated visualization include bin-
ning [24] and density map [32]. Figure 5 compares the visualization
results between these two designs.
The binning design includes several pie charts to represent the
proportion of participants(Figure 5b). Pie areas in a pie chart are
mapped to the numbers of data points in the grid. This design can
clearly show the contribution of each participant, although it is not
effective to visualize the global distribution.
The density map design is shown in Figure 5c. Mayorga
and Gleicher [32] indicated that the bandwidth of kernel density
estimation can be used as the abstraction metric. Density maps can
present the distribution intuitively. However, when the number of
participants increases, even the multi-class density map design [25]
is less effective to present distributions of multiple participants.
Thus, we choose density maps to present the distribution. It is
overlaid with a lattice to support data selections by grids.
Descriptive views. When regions are selected in the projection
views, their attributes are presented in the descriptive views. We
use a bar chart (Figure 4e) to present the contributions of each
participant in the selected region. This view helps participants to
identify the sources of interested data, i.e., who owns the interested
data. Parallel coordinates (Figure 4f) are used to visualize the
specific attributes of selected local points. If the data type is
image, the snapshots of local data replace parallel coordinates for
data presentations. Because of data privacy, participants can only
visualize the high-dimensional representation of local data.
6 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present three case studies to evaluate the
effectiveness of SMAP. The first two cases are conducted to
simulate real-world distributed machine learning tasks. We invited
collaborators to perform in-lab studies, and observed and recorded
the entire processes. In the third case, SMAP was deployed to three
hospitals where it was used and evaluated by real users in their daily
work.
6.1 Data Purchasing
The first case simulates a data market scenario where a data
consumer (M) purchases data to improve his own small dataset to
have enough data points in each class while avoiding introducing
Figure 4: The user interface for participants. (a): the task list; (b): the task description view; (c): the global projection view; (d): the individual
projection view; (e): the bar chart of contributions; and (f): the parallel coordinates/snapshot list.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Design choices for aggregated visualization. Color
encodes data ownership in the scatterplots and binning plots. (a)
the original result of joint t-SNE; (b) the binning design; (c) the
density map.
outliers. As being used in interactive labeling applications [9, 29],
t-SNE aims to provide visual details, such as distribution of classes
and outliers, which may be ignored by global statistics. Moreover,
the joint embedding aligns the projections of consumer’s data and
provider’s data and allows comparison between them.
In this case, we used the Clothing 1M dataset [45] that contains
14 classes of cloth images (e.g., T-shirt, Shirt, Knitwear). We
assume that the data market finds three retailers (A, B, and C), each
of which provides 3000 data points. The consumer M also has a
smaller dataset of 1000 data points. A machine learning expert was
invited to act as the consumer M in this case study.
After examining the local dataset with t-SNE (Figure 6), the
expert found that the outliers (e.g., region L3 in Figure 6), the
mixing of classes (e.g., region L1 in Figure 6), and the split of
classes (e.g., region L1 in Figure 6) are the major issues.
Then, the expert was instructed to use the SMAP system for
browsing and choosing appropriate datasets from the data market.
In the task list, he focused on the three joint embedding tasks
prepared by the providers of clothing datasets. They were displayed
in scatterplots with class labels attached to the data points. To
Figure 6: The t-SNE embedding of M’s data.
explore the quality of these datasets, the expert iteratively joined
in the three tasks for joint embeddings between his data and
the providers’ data datasets. Here, the embedding results were
generated in advance due to the time-consuming computation.
Figure 1 shows the joint embeddings of the three tasks. The
class structures (in terms of their labels and relative density) of
the three datasets were generally the same as the expert’s own
dataset. Figure 7 presents the partial scatterplots of the three joint
embeddings where the expert observed some differences, especially
for the dataset B. For example, the dataset B (Figure 7b2) lacked
of some sub-cluster structures in comparison to Figure 7b1. This
data insufficiency issue will result in performance degradation of
the trained models [14]. The dataset C had all the important cluster
structures (Figure 7c2) comparing with Figure 7c1. However, there
were many outliers (e.g., regions L4, L5, and L6 in Figure 7c2).
Based on the experience of examining M’s local data, the expert
made a hypothesis that there would be also many mislabeled data
points in dataset C. Figure 1a and Figure 7a2 show that most local
samples are covered by the dataset A appropriately. In addition, the
number of outliers in the dataset A is fewer than that in the dataset
C. As a result, he decided to purchase the dataset A.
(a1) (a2)
(b1) (b2)
(c1) (c2)
Figure 7: The partial scatterplots of joint embedding results. The
three rows are the results of joint embeddings between M and A (a1,
a2), M and B (b1, b2), and M and C (c1, c2), respectively. The left
column is the part of M’s local data. The right column is the part of
providers’ data.
6.2 Multi-party Data Analysis for Identical Distribution
This case was conducted in a decentralized learning scenario
inspired by Zhao et al. [49]. In this scenario, it is important that the
data distribution of all participants are independent and identical
distribution (IID). The non-IID issue will hinder the performance
of further machine learning applications. The SMAP system is
expected to be effective in handling this challenging task.
We used the MNIST dataset, which is also used in Zhao et
al. [49], and reduced its data dimension to 32 with PCA. At
the beginning, five different subsets containing 800 data points
were distributed to five participants, respectively. All of them are
master students with a research background in machine learning.
They were instructed to use the SMAP to compare the data
distribution with a secure joint embedding. To protect the point-
level information of the data, the participants were asked to show
the embedding results with density map.
Figure 8a1 shows the joint embedding results for all data points.
The partial density maps of the participants A–E are shown in
Figure 8a2–a6, respectively. When comparing the individual results
with the global distribution, all participants found their data missed
one or more cluster structures. The missing clusters are denoted by
ellipses in Figure 8. For example, Figure 8a2 shows that the data of
Participant A is sparse in region L1 and absent in region L0. From
this view, Participant A concluded that two clusters were potentially
missed in the data. After examining the results of other participants
in SMAP, Participant A found that the local data in L2–L5 were
missed in other participants’ individual data. By performing the
comparison analysis in SMAP, all participants were confident that
the distributions of individual data were non-IID.
To ease the non-IID issue, the participants were introduced
the data sharing strategy proposed in [49]. Specifically, each
participant was asked to provide 120 points to compose a small
shared subset of global data. To preserve data privacy, new
data points were generated based on local distribution rather than
exposing individual data directly. To evaluate the efficiency of
our approach in composing the shared subset, they compared two
strategies for selecting local data. First, without using joint t-
SNE, each participant was asked to perform a uniform sampling
of their local data to create the shared subset. This strategy was
proposed in [49]. The second strategy was guided by the joint t-
SNE of SMAP. The participants adapted to share more data points
in the region where other participants lacked data. For example,
Participant A could sample 120 points in region L2–L5 only rather
than in the entire domain. The two strategies were performed by
the participants in two rounds of joint t-SNE. The results of the
uniform strategy and adaptive strategy are shown in Figure 8b1–
b6 and Figure 8c1–c6, respectively. By visually comparing the
heterogeneous regions of the results, all participants were confident
that both strategies can ease the non-IID issue. For example, the
data of Participant A in region L0 increases in both Figure 8b2
and Figure 8c2. Furthermore, in the results of the adaptive strategy
(Figure 8c2-c6), the distribution difference among participants is
smaller than that of the uniform strategy (Figure 8b2-b6).
6.3 Multi-party Data Analysis for Health Data
In this case, we tested SMAP among three community hospitals.
These hospitals have health records of their patients from their an-
nual health examination, and the records in each hospital represent
the statistical characteristics of people from specific professions.
The community hospitals would like to analyze local data in the
context of a more general population to promote the service for
local communities. However, due to the constraints of data privacy,
they cannot fuse health data from multiple hospitals directly for
joint analysis.
To address this issue, we provided SMAP to them for secure
multi-party visual analysis. We explained the mechanism of our
secure multi-party visualization to them and signed contracts that
ensure the security of local data. To prevent the collusion between
two collaborators, we serve as the collaborator T to hold encrypted
data. The collaborator S is served by an external company which is
trusted by all hospitals.
Hospital A, B, and C sampled 280, 107, and 159 records for male
patients, respectively. These hospitals are the designated hospital
by a design institution, a heavy industry factory, and a high-tech
company, respectively. The records have nine data dimensions,
including the indices of physical examination and routine blood
test. The data were normalized by dimension before the joint
embedding. The three hospitals shared the range of each dimension
to support the normalization. We collected the joint embedding
results from the hospitals and requested hospital A to record their
analysis process and snapshots. The joint embedding results are
presented in Figure 9. The sub-maps of three institutions show
that while three datasets covered similar areas, there are differences
on the density distributions. Hospital A was interested in these
differences and explored them with the visual interface. Four
Figure 8: The results of joint embedding. (a1): the joint embedding result of five participants; (a2)–(a6): the partial density maps of
participants A–E, respectively; (b1)–(b6): the joint embedding results of the uniform sharing strategy; and (c1)–(c6): the joint embedding
results of the adaptive sharing strategy.
grided regions with salient differences are selected (G1–G4 in
Figure 9b–d). Note that although hospital A denoted the grids in
the subgraph of other hospitals, the parallel coordinates show only
local data. Therefore, hospital A can only infer the distribution
of other communities by local data. In additon, hospital A can
know the contribution of each hospital in the interested region
from the bar chart. The corresponding statistics are shown in
the parallel coordinates (Figure 9a-d). To preserve data privacy,
hospital A sent us aggregated parallel coordinates rather than the
original results. The four grided regions represent four groups of
people. The distributions on age show that while people in the
design institution are grouped into young designers (Figure 10(a))
and senior designers (Figure 10(b)), the factory has more young
people (Figure 10(d)) than the other two communities. The Body
Mass Index (BMI) indicates that people in the factory have lower
BMIs. It may be caused by more physically-demanding work in the
factory. A few records in G1, G2, and G4 exceed the upper limit
of the normal value of the Lymphocyte Count (LY). It may indicate
chronic inflammation, which would be caused by long-time sitting
of designers or physical labor by factory workers. In contrast to
people in G1, G2, and G4, people in G3 have a regular LY index.
With regard to PLT (platelet count), people in G1 and G2 have a
higher index than other institutions. It may indicate the risk of
thrombus. In conclusion, hospital A found that people in the high-
tech company (mainly in G3) have more regular indices than the
other two communities. People in the design institution (G1 and
G2) should be more active physically, while the factory community
(G4) should rest more and have balanced exercises.
6.4 Expert Review
After each case study, we interviewed the experts and participants
and summarized their comments. In case 1, the expert appreciated
that the joint embedding provided aligned projections across data
holders without having data from each other. The projections
provided more information than statistics, such as the range, av-
erage, and variance of data, and made him more confident. He
also commented that more type of projection algorithms, such as
the PCA that he is familiar with, are expected to support more
flexible analysis. In case 2, the five master students in machine
learning appreciated the feature of the joint embedding in guiding
the selection of shared data points. They agreed that it can enhance
the flexibility and confidence of the data sharing strategy. In case
3, the expert in hospital A liked the design of our system. The
learning cost is low because he is familiar with most plots , except
the parallel coordinates graph. He indicated that it is flexible to
compare distributions among three hospitals. He commented that it
would be more promising if the hospital needs not to send encrypted
data to the collaborator to fulfill stricter security rules. He pointed
out that the computation speed was slow and he had to wait for 20
minutes for the embedding result.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the characteristics of our approach, future
research opportunities, and the limitation of our approach.
Privacy-preserving embedding scheme. We identify two key
issues, data decentralization and privacy preserving, as essential
differences between the proposed joint embedding scheme and
conventional embedding approaches. Our contribution lies in the
scheme for secure multi-party t-SNE. Specifically, our protocol
is designed to compute the distance matrix across multiple par-
ticipants while avoiding the exposure of the distance matrix to
participants and collaborators. It would be interesting to apply our
scheme to other dimensionality reduction approaches. Our scheme
can directly support PCA, because it needs only to compute the
covariance matrix rather than the distance matrix. The covariance
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 9: The joint embedding results of health records. (a): the
density map of all data; and (b)–(d): the partial density map of
hospital A, B, and C, respectively.
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Figure 10: Aggregated parallel coordinates of the selected local
data. (a)–(d): local data in G1–G4, respectively. WBC: white blood
cell count; LY: lymphocyte count; MONO: monocyte count; HGB:
hemoglobin concentration; PLT: platelet count, BMI: body mass
index.
Table 2: The time cost in a hypothetical scenario with high
performance computing clusters (300 3.2GHz CPUs with 104
cores).
Step 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Time 0.1s 0.1s 10.4s 13.3s 11.0s 3.1s 0.7s
matrix contains much less sensitive information. Applying our
scheme to UMAP and ISOMAPmay face some challenges, because
for these two approaches, the distances among the k-nearest neigh-
bors must be computed. These distances are a subset of the full
distance matrix , and the fraction reduction cannot be performed
in the step 7 of our protocol to protect the distance matrix. More
research is need to evaluate the risk in disclose this subset.
Secure collaborative visual analysis. The proposed approach
does not have a collaborative analysis implementation, because
synchronous analysis and shared interactions are not required in
our scenarios. However, secure multi-party visualization provides
a shared workspace. All participants share the same visualization
but have only the authority to access their own data. A secure
distributed collaboration can be naturally supported. There are
many scenarios of the new mode of collaborative visual analysis.
For example, the expert participated in our data market case
suggested that voting or recommending for interesting data points
would be useful in a crowdsourcing manner so that the consumers
can estimate the price more accurately and confidently. Without
the secure multi-party visualization, however, it is impractical to
explore the multiple attributes of data points for making effective
recommendations. Organizing secure collaborative visual analysis
in different scenarios would be an interesting future work.
Time performance. The proposed secure multi-party visualization
scheme is time-consuming. The most critical parts are data
encryption/decryption and arithmetic operations on encrypted data.
The time complexity of computations on encrypted data is linear
to the dimensionality and the number of data points. In our
implementation, in the case of “Data Purchasing”, it takes about
32 hours to perform each task (4,000 points with 32 dimensions).
The 32 dimensional representation of Clothing 1M dataset is from
Xiang et al. [44]. In the case of “Federated Learning”, the time
for the task in round 1 (4,000 data points with 32 dimensions) is
about 32 hours and about 50 hours for the task in round 2 (6,400
data points with 32 dimensions). In the case of health data analysis,
it takes 20 minutes to carry out the task (546 data points with 9
dimensions).
Due to the high computation cost, we need to speed up the
secure joint embedding. A practical solution is to employ high
performance computing clusters. For example, we can find a typical
set of cloud computing clusters that contain 300 3.2GHz virtual
CPUs with 104 cores, which are 2971 times faster than the server
in our implementation. If we equip each participant and collaborate
with such a cluster and connect them with a 1.25GB/s network, the
time cost for communications and computations could be reduced
significantly. Specifically, Table 2 presents the hypothetical time
cost of each step in case 2 with such a cluster. The distance matrix
related calculation in Step 3, 4, and 5 takes around 10s. With
a speed of 1.25GB/s, the transition of encrypted noised distance
matrix in step 4, which is the largest transferred data in the whole
process, needs 14.5s. The whole protocol needs 29.2s for the
transition.
Overlaps in scatterplots. While overlaps in scatterplots is in-
evitable when number of points grows, the analysis of scatterplots-
based embedding results, such as identifying outliers, is affected.
In this paper, we rendered the data points in random order to ease
this issue. In the future, we would like to try more solution. For
example, we can render data points with transparency. We can
also employ outlier detection algorthms and highlight the detected
outliers.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a joint t-SNE scheme for secure multi-
party visualization, implemented an online system for organizing
and exploring joint embedding tasks, and tested the SMAP system
through one case in real environment and two cases in laboratory
environments. Our major contribution is to develop a secure multi-
party scheme for dimensionality reduction approaches. Specifically,
we proposed an instance of joint t-SNE.
There are several interesting future directions to address the
limitations of our approach. First, it is valuable to speed up
secure multi-party projection. The future breakthrough on secure
multi-party could facilitate the advancement of secure multi-party
projection. Second, secure collaborative analysis enabled by joint
embedding is also a promising direction. Third, secure multi-party
visualization for other data types is worth studying.
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